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Abstract
Using a simple overlapping generations model, this note shows that an improvement in the
efficiency of human capital investment decreases the net income of the young household
while increasing that of the old. Without compensating redistribution, it deteriorates lifetime
utilities of all generations except for the initial old households.
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In the literature of endogenous growth, it is well known that the eﬃciency of
human capital investment critically aﬀects the long-term path of aggregate output.1
This note demonstrates that the investment eﬃciency also has a nontrivial eﬀect
on the intergenerational distribution of income, aﬀecting adversely the welfare of
households in the long run. We present a simple overlapping generations model in
which young households invest in the process of human capital production (namely,
education). With a higher investment eﬃciency, each young household increases
the supply of human capital. The increased aggregate supply of human capital, on
one hand, raises the productivity of physical capital and the interest rate, thereby
raising the income of old households. On the other hand, the net income of young
households is reduced because the increased aggregate supply lowers the price
of their innate human capital (i.e., wages) while the revenue from selling extra
human capital is oﬀset by the interest payments on investment expenses.2 Although
the initial old households unilaterally beneﬁt from increased interest earnings, the
overall welfare eﬀect on subsequent generations is shown to be negative under
plausible parameter values.
2. Model
Production Technology. A version of Diamond’s (1965) overlapping generations
model is considered, in which time is divided into periods t =1 ,2,···,∞.I ne a c h
period, a single ﬁnal good, denoted by Yt, is competitively produced from physical
capital Kt and human capital Ht by a Cobb-Douglas technology. The production
function is Yt = AKα
t H
1−α
t ,w h e r eA>0a n dα ∈ (0,1), respectively, represent
total factor productivity and the share of physical capital. Factor markets are
perfectly competitive, so that the market price of physical capital rt and that of
human capital wt,i nt e r m so ft h eﬁnal good, are determined by their marginal
1In a model with a representative agent, Lucas (1988) and many others have shown that the
long-term rate of economic growth is an increasing function of the eﬃciency of human capital
investment. Our separate paper (Kitagawa, Horii and Futagami 2003) shows in an overlapping
generations setting that an expansion in the maximum rate at which human capital can be
accumulated (e.g., a greater availability of higher education) has non-monotonic eﬀects on the
long-term rate of growth.
2In a static model of child labor, Basu and Van (1998) also showed that an exogenous expansion
of labor-supply capacity does not necessarily beneﬁt its suppliers.
1productivities:
rt = Aα(Kt/Ht)
α−1,w t = A(1 − α)(Kt/Ht)
α. (1)
The ﬁnal goods produced in a certain period can either be consumed in that period
or be saved for production in the next period. Once saved, the good can either
be used as an input to human capital production or be used directly as physical
capital, which implies that the price of the saved good (i.e. the interest rate) is rt.
Human and physical capital depreciates within one period and therefore cannot be
carried over to subsequent periods.
Households. At each period, there are two generations of households, which we call
the young and the old. Each generation contains a unit mass of households and
lives for two periods. The objective of the generation t households (those born at
period t) is to maximize their lifetime utility
ut =( 1− β)lnc1t + β lnc2t+1, (2)
where β ∈ (0,1) is a parameter specifying the patience of agents and c1t and
c2t+1 represent their consumption in youth and old age. Each young household is
endowed with δ > 0 units of human capital, which are either possessed innately
or obtained through home education without explicit expenditure.3 In addition,
they can augment their human capital through investment (i.e., higher education),
which must be ﬁnanced by borrowing from the old. Let et ≥ 0 be the amount of
saved goods borrowed from the old generation to invest in this process. Then the
total amount of their human capital is
Ht = δ + γet, (3)
where parameter γ ≥ 0r e p r e s e n t st h ee ﬃciency of human capital investment,
aﬀected by such factors as the quality of the education environment in the economy.
They sell oﬀ t h e i rh u m a nc a p i t a la tm a r k e tp r i c ewt and in return receive wt(δ+γet)
units of the ﬁnal good. After repaying rtet units of the ﬁnal good, they consume
part of their net income at the end of that period and save the remainder for
consumption in their old age. The intertemporal budget constraint is
c1t + c2t+1/rt+1 = wt(δ + γet) − rtet. (4)
3It is natural to assume that individuals have some ability to work even without no formal
education (e.g., child labor in least developed countries). Assumption δ > 0i sa l s or e q u i r e dt o
obtain sensible results; if we set δ = 0, then equation (7) below implies that both consumption
and saving are always zero.
2For every t ≥ 0, the generation t households choose et, c1t and c2t+1 so as to






=0 i fγwt − rt < 0;
∈ [0,+∞)i f γwt − rt =0 ;
=+ ∞ if γwt − rt > 0.
(5)
Since human capital investment must be ﬁnite in equilibrium, condition (5) implies
that
γwt − rt ≤ 0 with equality whenever et > 0. (6)
From (6), we see that the maximized net income is δwt. Since the equilibrium
rate of return from human capital investment is zero, the net income of the young
household is simply the market value of endowed human capital. Then, from (2)
and (4), the consumption and savings of generation t ≥ 0 households in equilibrium
are written in terms of factor prices:
c1t =( 1− β)δwt,c 2t+1 = βδrt+1wt,S t = βδwt. (7)
At period 0, the initial old (generation −1) households are endowed with S0 > 0
units of saved goods and consume r0S0 units of ﬁnal goods in exchange for their
endowment.
Equilibrium. Substituting (1) and (3) into condition (6) gives a relation between
two kinds of capital,








Aggregate demand for the saved good consists of demand for physical capital Kt
and demand for input to human capital investment. From (3), the latter is γ−1(Ht−
δ). Thus, the market-clearing condition for saved goods is
Kt + γ
−1(Ht − δ)=St−1, (9)
where St−1 is the savings of generation t − 1 households. Given St−1, (8) and (9)








if St−1 ≤ b S(γ);
¡
α(St−1 + δ/γ),(1 − α)(γSt−1 + δ)
¢
if St−1 > b S(γ),
(10)
3Panel 1: γ ≤ b γ Panel 2: γ > b γ
Figure 1: Saving Dynamics. The saving locus is ﬁrst increasing and then becomes ﬂat
at e S(γ) ≡ Aαα(1−α)1−αβδγ−α. The horizontal line at e S(γ)s h i f t sd o w na sγ increases.
where b S(γ) ≡ αδ/((1 − α)γ). Equation (10) shows that the young households
invest in human capital if and only if St−1 is larger than b S(γ).




t−1 if St−1 ≤ b S(γ);
Aαα(1 − α)1−αβδγ−α if St−1 > b S(γ).
(11)
Given initial S0 > 0, equation (11) generates the equilibrium sequence of aggregate




(A(1 − α)β)1/(1−α)δ ≤ b S(γ)i f γ ≤ b γ;
Aαα(1 − α)1−αβδγ−α > b S(γ)i f γ > b γ,
(12)
where b γ ≡ α(βA(1 − α)2−α)
−1/(1−α). The pair of factor prices in the steady state









1/(1−α) ,α/((1 − α)β)
¢
if γ ≤ b γ;
¡
Aαα(1 − α)1−αγ−α,Aαα(1 − α)1−αγ1−α¢
if γ > b γ.
(13)
3. Implications of a Higher Investment Eﬃciency
Intergenerational Income Distribution. Equation (12) implies that in the long run
households invest in human capital only if γ > b γ.W h e n γ is in this range, (13)
4shows that a higher eﬃciency of human capital investment increases the interest
rate but reduces the wage rate in the steady state. Then, from (7), consumption
of young households decreases, whereas that of old households tends to increase.
The intuition behind this redistributional eﬀect is as follows. Since the net income
of young households is the market value of their endowed human capital, δwt,
the increased aggregate supply of human capital reduces the market value of their
endowment and therefore their net income. It decreases their young-age consump-
tion because they always ﬁnd it optimal to consume a constant fraction of the net
income. Their savings are also low, but the old-age consumption can be higher be-
cause the increased supply of human capital boosts the interest rate. Speciﬁcally,
when γ > b γ, consumption of old households is (Aαα(1 − α)1−α)2βδγ1−2α,w h i c hi s
increasing in γ given that α < 1/2. We assume, reasonably, that α < 1/2 because
α is the share of physical (non human) capital.
Welfare eﬀects. We now examine how the change in the intergenerational income
distribution aﬀects the overall welfare of households. Substituting (7) and (13)
into the utility function (2) gives the lifetime utility of consumers in the steady
state:
u
∗(γ)=c o n s t a n t+l nw
∗(γ)+β lnr
∗(γ)
=c o n s t a n t+( β(1 − α) − α)lnγ.
(14)
Lifetime utility is decreasing in γ if (and only if)
β < α/(1 − α). (15)
Recall that α is the share of physical capital while β is the young agents’ propensity
to save. Using a conventional value of 0.3 for α, condition (15) becomes β <
0.428, which is met under plausible values for β. In addition, (15) coincides with
the condition for the economy to be dynamically eﬃcient for all γ in the steady
state because applying (15) for (13) gives r∗(γ) ≥ α/((1 − α)β) > 1.4 Therefore,
given that parameters are within an empirically plausible range or in a range
that guarantees the economy’s dynamic eﬃciency, the utility loss among young
households dominates the (discounted) utility gain that can be enjoyed later when
they become old.
Who beneﬁts? One may wonder why relaxing one of the resource constraints in
the economy results in an adverse consequence. To be precise, the economy with a
4Since population is constant over time, dynamic eﬃciency requires the gross interest rate to
be higher than 1.
5high γ is not Pareto inferior to the economy with a low γ, because consumption of
the initial old households is higher in the economy with a high γ.5 Contrary to the
usual perception, a higher investment eﬃciency actually beneﬁt the old generation
who has already ﬁnished the investment process while thrusting future generations
into an ‘educational rat race’.
Compensating Policies. When combined with appropriate redistributional policies,
however, a better environment for human capital investment can has a positive
eﬀect on the welfare of all generations. Substituting (10) into the production







0i f St−1 ≤ b S(γ).
Aαα ((1 − α)γ)
−α
³
St−1 − b S(γ)
´
> 0i f St−1 > b S(γ).
(16)
Given St−1, (16) shows that aggregate output is increasing in γ whenever young
households invest in human capital. Thus, old households beneﬁt from a larger γ
even when the authority implements a lump-sum redistribution policy that trans-
fers income from the old to the young so that the income of young households
(and therefore their savings) are unaﬀected by the increase in γ.W h e nc o n t i n u e d
forever, this combination of a larger γ and the intergenerational transfer beneﬁts
all generations because they can enjoy more consumption when old while consump-
tion in their youth is unchanged. In an economy with a highly developed education
system, this argument legitimizes income transfers from old to young in the forms
of grants and scholarships funded by taxes on the elder generation.6
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